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Outsourcing and firm performance—a
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This article aims at analyzing (i) the factors determining the firms’ propensity to
outsource various processes (production of intermediate products, production of
final products, R&D activities, ICT activities), and (ii) the impact of outsourcing on
firms’ innovation performance, as well as labor productivity. The integral investi-
gation of the determining factors, as well as the impact of outsourcing on innov-
ation and productivity based on the same data in a comparative setting
(Switzerland versus Greece) are important new elements and contributions of
this study to the existing empirical literature. It has been concluded that in both
countries more innovative firms (R&D) were stronger inclined to outsourcing activ-
ities than less innovative ones, whereas on the contrary, the educational level of
employees and the labor cost showed no effect on outsourcing in both countries.
Also, the intensity of ICT use and organizational aspects, especially those related to
the formal structure of workplace organization, were relevant for the Swiss firms
but not for the Greek firms. With respect to the impact of outsourcing on per-
formance, it has been concluded that it tends to enhance innovation, particularly
process innovation, but only weakly productivity (at least directly).
JEL classification: L24, O31.
1. Introduction
The considerable reduction of transport costs, but more importantly, the develop-
ment and rapid diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICT) in
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the last two decades have had large economic impacts through the transformation of
work processes, organizational structures and modes of inter-firm, as well as
intra-firm communications. In combination with the opening of markets at both
national and global levels, these technological advances led to new possibilities of
trade of goods and particularly, services that allowed firms to decrease their degree of
integration, thus increase their ability to operate more flexibly under the conditions
of considerably more intensive international competition. Outsourcing, referring to
the relocation of within-firm processes and functions to external providers either at
home or abroad, has been one of these flexibility strategies (Heshmati, 2003; Olsen,
2006). Given the relative importance of outsourcing as a major firm restructuring
strategy in the last 20 years, we find it reasonable to investigate both the causes of
outsourcing and its consequences for firms’ economic performance.
In this direction the contribution of the article is threefold: (i) analysis of the
factors determining the firms’ propensity to outsource various processes and func-
tions; (ii) investigation of the impact of outsourcing on firms’ innovation perform-
ance; and also (iii) on labor productivity. The integral study of the determining
factors, as well as the impact of outsourcing on innovation and productivity based
on the same data in a comparative setting (Switzerland versus Greece) are important
new elements and contributions of this study to the existing empirical literature.
A further interesting feature of this study is that it covers four important types of
outsourcing and also all business sectors of the economy (manufacturing, construc-
tion and services). Further, our comparative study refers to two countries, Greece
and Switzerland, which are characterized by different levels of economic develop-
ment. Different levels of economic development imply different levels of techno-
logical advance also at firm-level on the average. Recent studies found that there is a
link between corporate strategy and distance to (industry) technological frontier (see,
e.g. Coad, 2011). Thus, it can be expected that the national environment would also
exercise an influence on the type of applied corporate strategy, for example, with
respect to outsourcing activities.
In this article, relocation to external providers is related to (parts of) the produc-
tion process (final products and intermediate products), as well as Research and
Development (R&D) ICT activities, and is measured directly by having firms report-
ing whether they have externalized these particular processes and functions in the
period 2000–2005. The data for 1575 Swiss firms and 254 Greek firms were collected
in 2005 by means of a survey based on an identical questionnaire.
In a first step, we developed a model of the determinants of outsourcing and
estimated this model for the above four different categories of outsourcing. We used
a multivariate probit estimator in order to take account of the interdependence of the
four outsourcing activities due to the fact that many firms reported more than one
outsourcing activity. The results showed remarkable differences between the different
forms of outsourcing, as well as between the two countries. Intensive use of ICT was
important for the outsourcing of ICT and R&D in Switzerland but not in Greece.
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Organizational aspects, especially those related to the formal structure of workplace
organization, were relevant for the Swiss firms but not for the Greek ones. The
educational level of employees showed no effect for both countries. A common
trait of both countries has been that more innovative firms (R&D) were stronger
inclined to outsourcing activities than less innovative ones. Market conditions
(demand, competition) were of minor importance. A further interesting result was
that labor costs did not appear to be a significant factor determining the likelihood of
outsourcing.
In a second step, we developed a model of innovation performance, which also
included outsourcing as additional explanatory factor. The model was estimated by
probit separately for product (INNOPD) and process innovation (INNOPC). The
exogeneity of the sourcing variables was tested (Rivers–Vuong test) and, if necessary,
an instrument variable estimation was conducted. We found positive effect of
outsourcing of the production of final and intermediate products on the propen-
sity to product innovations for both countries, and also of R&D outsourcing
for Switzerland. Further, we found positive effects for all four outsourcing
activities for Switzerland and for three of them for Greece in the case of process
innovation.
In a third step, we investigated the effects of outsourcing on labor productivity by
inserting the outsourcing variables in a productivity equation. Also in this case, the
exogeneity of the outsourcing variables was tested. The results showed a positive
effect of R&D outsourcing in the case of Switzerland and a positive effect of the
outsourcing of the production of final products in the case of Greece. Thus, the
productivity effects seem to be considerably weaker than the innovation effects.
Outsourcing activities tend to enhance innovation, particularly process innovation,
but only weakly directly productivity; the productivity effects seem to be interme-
diated by new products and processes.
The structure of the article is as follows: in Section 2 the conceptual framework of
the study is presented (theoretical concepts, related empirical literature, and speci-
fication of the regression models of this study). Section 3 refers to Swiss and Greek
data we used for this study, whereas Section 4 to the results (concerning initially the
determinants of the four examined types of outsourcing, and then their impact on
innovaion and labor productivity) and Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1 Determinants of outsourcing
2.1.1 Basic theoretical concepts
The theoretical discussion on a firm’s decision to produce in-house or outsource
through market contracts is extensive and dates back to Coase (1937) and his theory
of the firm. Most of this theoretical discussion has focused on three approaches that
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are partly overlapping, partly complementary to each other: the transaction cost
theory (see, e.g. Williamson, 1975), the principal-agent theory (see, e.g. Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), and the property rights theory (see, e.g. Alchian and Demsetz,
1972).
According to the transaction cost theory, outsourcing can be profitable only if the
expected cost advantage is higher than the sum of the costs of search efforts to find a
suitable supplier, the costs of related asset-specific investments and costs of contract
imperfectness. For example, if investments result in greater asset specificity as a
consequence of technical advances, firms fearing expropriation of investments that
are not directly controlled by the firm would avoid outsourcing.
According to agency theory, informational asymmetries with respect to employee
performance between employees and employers in combination with conflicting
goals and interests between these two groups of actors can lead to productivity
losses. To reduce inefficiencies stemming from this source, employers can outsource
part of the activities performed within the firm to external provider and control the
provider performance through an outcome-based contract.
In the context of outsourcing, the property rights theory predicts that vertical
integration between a supplier and a final good producer generates different cost and
benefits to each of the parties (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Therefore, the incentives
to integrate or outsource would depend on whether the investments of the suppliers
or the producers are relatively more important for the success of their relationship.
Some of empirical studies have focused on testing these theories. For example,
Acemoglu et al. (2010) found evidence consistent with the prediction of the property
rights theory, namely that high technology intensity (as measured by R&D intensity)
in the final goods industry is related to more vertical integration (thus less out-
sourcing), whereas technology intensity in the supplier industry is associated with
less integration. In a further study, Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2008) investigated
to what extent outsourcing decisions can be explained by a simple property rights
model. Their main findings were accordingly that greater specificity makes outsour-
cing less likely and complementarities between the investments of the buyer and the
seller are also associated with less outsourcing.
However, many empirical studies use rather ad hoc theoretical frameworks, pre-
sumably due to the fact that the theoretical approaches discussed above are difficult
to operationalize for empirical work (see, e.g. Osterloh, 2004).
Finally, the business and management literature emphasizes benefits and risks of
outsourcing, often focusing on the importance of outsourcing of noncore activities
that allows firms to concentrate on their core activities and thus increase productivity
in these activities. Hamel and Prahalad (1990) first introduced the concept of core
competencies in the management literature.1 This view is also in accordance with the
1See, for example, Quinn and Hilmer (1994) for a discussion on how outsourcing can enhance
firms’ performance on core activities.
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approaches in economic literature that emphasize the increasing incentives of firms
to scale down (“downsizing”) and specialize under the pressure of intensified inter-
national competition, as well as rapid technological change (see, e.g. Milgrom and
Roberts, 1995).2
2.1.2 An industry-equilibrium view of outsourcing
Grossman and Helpman (2002) developed a framework for the analysis of the in-
dustrial structure, in which vertical integration or outsourcing emerges as equilib-
rium outcome of an industry. The main idea underlying the model is the trade-off
between costs related to in-house production and contracts with external suppliers.
In this sense it is related to transaction costs theory. In sum, the industry equilibrium
approach of Grossman and Helpman emphasizes the relevance of two variables (not
explicitly linked to the specific transaction) that are useful for empirical analysis: the
number of suppliers and the degree of competition in the producing industry.
However, although the number of suppliers positively affects the probability of out-
sourcing, the effect of more intensive competition on final goods market is not
straightforward. It depends on the balance between cost advantages and diseco-
nomies of scope for specialized and integrated firms (see the discussion in Merino
and Rodriguez Rodriguez, 2007).
2.1.3 A firm-characteristics view of outsourcing
The role of labor costs, demand fluctuations, export propensity, and firm size: according
to Abraham and Taylor (1996), a firm’s decision to contract out may be influenced
by costs (e.g. when suppliers pay lower wages than producers), the volatility of a
firm’s output demand that determines the work load of the regular workforce, thus
causing high costs when the volatility is high, so that a producing firm would prefer
to transfer to suppliers, and the availability of specialized skills by the external sup-
plier that are scarce in the producing firm itself. At least two hypotheses for empirical
work can be gained from this approach: (i) firms with relatively high labor costs are
stronger inclined to outsource activities than firms with relatively lower labor costs;
(ii) when a firm is confronted with strong fluctuating demand the incentives for
outsourcing of production are higher than when it is confronted with smoothly
fluctuating demand.
Go¨rg et al. (2008) argue that exporters have a potential advantage vis-a`-vis
nonexporters in accessing extensive knowledge about where to procure low-cost
inputs in the world market, which is an important precondition for outsourcing.
This is in line with the model of Grossman and Helpman (2002), which emphasizes
the importance of search costs for international sourcing.
2See Osterloh (2004: 69–111) for a survey of the literature on the motives and risks of outsourcing.
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The role of firm size is a rather controversial issue in literature. The management
literature on core competency would suggest a negative relation between firm size
and outsourcing. Small firms have strong incentives to concentrate their limited
resources to core activities, thus to outsource noncore activities (see, e.g. Abraham
and Taylor, 1996). In favor of a positive relation can be argued that subcontracting
allows large firms to reduce costs by enhancing flexibility of production (see, e.g.
Kimura, 2002). Merino and Rodriguez Rodriguez (2007) argue that firm size has a
direct influence on a firm’s decision to outsource. If economies of scale are relevant
either in the production of some components and other intermediate inputs or in the
provision of R&D inputs we would expect small firms to be more strongly inclined to
outsource such services than larger ones. In contrast, larger firms would have com-
parative advantages vis-a`-vis smaller firms for in-house activities. However, one has
to assume that beyond a certain threshold some kind of diseconomies of scale may
emerge due to increasing governance problems. As a consequence, the authors pos-
tulate an inversed-U relationship between firm size and outsourcing. We postulate a
positive relationship between outsourcing and firm size as the starting point of our
empirical investigation (see Section 2.1.5).
The role of technology, innovation, human capital, and workplace organization: the
existing literature provides controversial arguments also with respect to the influence
of R&D on outsourcing. A more conventional view argues that R&D-intensive
industries (or firms) tend to be vertically integrated in order to compensate the
high sunk costs related to R&D investment. An additional argument on the same
direction is that industries (or firms) with innovative products often face appropria-
bility problems, which they tend to solve through vertical integration (see, e.g. Teece,
1986). The idea is that technological change might deter firms from outsourcing
production of a product or component, for which competitors could more easily
copy an innovation (see, e.g. Williamson, 1985). Thus, there is some kind of trade-off
between the incentives of saving costs and the disincentives due to the risk of
copying.3
The contrary argument of a positive relationship between R&D intensity and
outsourcing is found in Bartel et al. (2009). These authors present a dynamic
model, in which the probability of outsourcing production is increasing in the
firm’s expectation of technological change. This model abstracts from other consid-
erations such as transaction costs or asset specificity. The main idea is that as the pace
of technological change in production techniques increases, a firm has less time to
amortize the sunk costs related to the adoption of new technologies. This makes
producing in-house with the newest technologies relatively more expensive than
3The relationship between innovation and outsourcing can be further complicated if technological
progress acts to reduce the cost asymmetries between suppliers and producers. Lewis and
Sappington (1991) present a model, in which the technology-driven reduction of cost asymmetries
leads to a decrease of suppliers’ cost advantage, thereby making outsourcing less likely.
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outsourcing. A further result of this model is that larger firms facing higher adjust-
ment costs from outsourcing, for example, due to lack of high-qualified personnel
also show a higher probability of producing in-house. In accordance to this
approach, we postulate a positive relationship between outsourcing and R&D.
Particularly with respect to ICT, the rapid decline of the price of ICT and the
increase of its use potential in the last years has meant that transactions that previ-
ously had to be conducted face-to-face within the firm can now be effectively con-
ducted outside the firm. ICT reduces the external transaction and coordination costs,
thus making it feasible for firms to outsource activities, which was previously pro-
hibitively expensive to do (Abramovsky and Griffith, 2006, 2009). For example,
outsourcing becomes more accessible because outside suppliers could be selected
and their work coordinated by computer-based systems (Malone et al., 1987).
In a similar sense as for ICT, there are some particular organizational character-
istics that also work in favor of outsourcing through the reduction of transaction
and coordination costs inside the firm: (i) the flexible and less formal form of the
overall firm organization as measured, for example, by the number of management
levels, the flexibility of workplace organization, as indicated, for example, by the
use of team-work, job-sharing, etc., and (ii) the degree of decentralization of
decision-making competency inside the firm (see the literature of functional flexi-
bility of labor, e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Lindbeck and Snower, 2000;
Kalleberg, 2001).
Further, we would expect that human capital endowment, a third important
factor that is often complementary to the intensive use of ICT and flexible forms
of workplace organization (see, e.g. Bresnahan et al., 2002), would influence the
tendency to outsourcing in the same direction as technology or organization. The
rationale is that firms employing highly qualified workers in their core activities that
are paid efficiency wages can save costs through the outsourcing of peripheral activ-
ities, for which wages above efficiency wages are paid (see Gusmano et al., 2010).
There is a rather loose connection between the different literature branches but
they can well serve as a conceptual guide for the specification of our model.
2.1.4 Related empirical literature
A series of empirical studies have been dealing recently with the factors determining
the outsourcing decisions of firms in several countries. Most of them are based on
firm data, whereas a few studies use industry data. There are two main groups of
studies with respect to the specification of the outsourcing variables. A first larger
group of papers uses binary information based on firms’ reports of overall outsour-
cing activities and/or different types of outsourcing. A second smaller group of in-
vestigations is based on quantitative measures of intermediate material or service
inputs. We could find only two studies combining both kinds of measurement
(Hempell and Zwick, 2008; Bartel et al., 2009).
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To the first group of studies belong all six studies reviewed here that are based on
Spanish firms data in the nineties. Merino and Rodriguez (2007) investigated based
on data from about 1400 firms in 1998, twelve different categories of services out-
sourcing (from legal advising to advertising, software development, and software
installation). These last two categories correspond to the ICT outsourcing variable
used in this study and are the only type of outsourcing that is common to this study
and our work. Therefore, we concentrate on the results referring to these two vari-
ables, particularly to this part of determinants that are similar to those used in this
study. These are the average labor costs (negative effect for software development, no
effect for software installation) and an inversed-U-effect for firm size that unifies
existing divergent theoretical expectations (see the discussion in Section 2.1.3 above).
Most of the other variables in this study refer to spatial factors that were not con-
sidered in our study.
The study of Diaz-Mora and Triguero (2007) based also on Spanish firms data for
the period 1992–2002 used a model specification that comes near to ours. They
found a positive effect on the likelihood of an (overall) outsourcing decision for
the average wage, the export propensity, an indicator for market competition, and
three different innovation variables, but no effect for firm size and firm age. Contrary
to these results, Holl (2008) found for about 3200 Spanish firms in the period 1990–
1999 positive effects on the likelihood of production subcontracting decisions for
firm size and firm age, in addition also positive effects for the average wage and
expected demand. In a further study based on the same (or a similar) data set and
using the likelihood of (overall) outsourcing as dependent variable Bartel et al.
(2008) could confirm—at least for one of their econometric specifications—
(partly) the positive effect of firm size, as well as the positive effects for firm age,
expanding market demand, export propensity, R&D activities, and IT use found in
some other studies. The same authors used in a further paper both kinds of out-
sourcing indicators (binary variable and quantitative intermediate input variable) in
an investigation concentrating on the role of technology and innovation (Bartel et al.,
2009). They found significant positive effects for R&D and product innovation for
both kinds of outsourcing indicators. This is an interesting result for an issue that is
controversially discussed in theoretical literature (see also the discussion in Mol,
2005; see also Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2010). Negative effects of R&D intensity on
outsourcing were found, for example, in Mol (2005) for a sample of Dutch industries
and in Tomiura (2008) for Japanese. To round up, a study for about 90 Spanish
industries in the period 1991–2002 found a positive effect for unit labor costs and
high skills but no effect for export propensity (Diaz-Mora, 2008).
To this first group of studies belong also two Italian studies that are based on firm
data from Emilia Romana and the Lombardy, respectively. Mazzanti et al. (2009)
used a small sample of 166 firms for their study in 1998–2001, but they disposed of
an extensive vector of explanatory variables. They found positive effects for firm age
and product innovation, no effect for the (relative) wage, negative effects for firm
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size, and for two organizational variables, one for organizational hierarchy a variable
similar to our ORG1; Table 1) and one for organizational innovation. Gusmano et al.
(2010) investigated a sample of 1200 firms in 2005 and found a positive effect for
R&D and human capital and no significant effects for a firm being exporter and for
firm size.
Finally, in a study for about 1300 UK firms in Gooroochurn and Hanley
(2007) could find the following effects on the likelihood of innovation outsourcing:
no effect for firm size, negative effect for R&D intensity for process innovation
and no effect for product innovation, negative effect for human capital in the
case of process innovation outsourcing and no effect for product innovation
outsourcing, and no effect for market concentration. The most interesting result
of this study is the negative effects of variables measuring the importance of property
rights.
To the second group of studies using the value of intermediate inputs divided by
some overall cost measure as an outsourcing indicator belong two UK studies, one
study based on Irish firms data and one based on German firms data. Girma and
Go¨rz (2004) used the cost of industry services as share of total labor costs as de-
pendent variable in a study for about 4500 UK manufacturing firms in the period
1980–1992. The most important determinants of outsourcing according to this study
are firm size (positive effect) and the average wage (also positive effects for the
separately measured average wage for skilled and unskilled workers, the unskilled
workers average wage showing a much lower elasticity than that of the skilled work-
ers). A further study based on about 25,000 UK firms in 2001/2002 using the value of
imported services divided by the total expenditure of purchased services as outsour-
cing variable found no effect for firm age and a positive effect for ICT (Abramovsky
and Griffith, 2006).
Debaere et al. (2010) found in a study of 538 Irish firms in 2004, a positive effect
for firm size and a positive effect for a firm being an exporter. As outsourcing
variables used the authors of this study the ratio of material and service inputs
over sales distinguishing imported and domestically procured materials and services.
Finally, in a study based on about 4500 German firms in 2002 and 2004, Hempell
and Zwick (2008) investigated both kinds of outsourcing variables and found for
both kinds positive effects for ICT use and export and a negative effect of human
capital only for the share of intermediate inputs but not for the binary variable for
outsourcing of business activities.
On the whole, the majority of the reviewed rather heterogeneous studies in terms
of sampling and model specification show only a few common results, namely posi-
tive effects for R&D, ICT, firm size, and export.
2.1.5 Resulting hypotheses
Based on the theoretical literature and the available empirical evidence, we formulate
the following hypotheses for the empirical part of the study with respect to the
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Table 1 Definition of the variables
Variables Definition/measurement
OUTS_IP Outsourcing of the production of intermediate products (yes/no) 2000–2005
OUTS_FP Outsourcing of the production of final products (yes/no) 2000–2005
OUTS_R&D Outsourcing of R&D activities (yes/no) 2000–2005
OUTS_IT Outsourcing of IT activities (yes/no) 2000–2005
INNOPD Introduction of product innovations 2003–2005
INNOPC Introduction of process innovations 2003–2005
LnQ/L Natural logarithm of value added per employee 2004
ICT Sum of the standardized values of the two variables INTERNET and INTRANET
INTERNET Six-level ordinate variable for the intensity of Internet use: share of employees
using Internet in daily work: 0: 0%; 1: 1%–20%; 2: 21%–40%; 3: 41%–60%;
4: 61%–80%; 5: 81%–100%
INTRANET Six-level ordinate variable for the intensity of Intranet use: share of employees
using intranet in daily work: 0: 0%; 1: 1%–20%; 2: 21%–40%; 3: 41%–60%;
4: 61%–80%; 5: 81%–100%
ORG1 Sum of the stardardized values of the three variables TWORK, JROT, and LEVEL
TWORK Ordinate variable measuring how widespread is team-work inside a firm on a
5-point Likert scale (1: “very weakly widespread”; 5: “very strongly wide-
spread”); team work: project groups, quality circles, semi-autonomous
teams, etc.
JROT Ordinate variable measuring how widespread is job rotation inside a firm on a
5-point Likert scale (1: “very weakly widespread”; 5: “very strongly wide-
spread”); team work: project groups, quality circles, semi-autonomous
teams, etc.
LEVEL Three-level ordinate variable for the change of the number of managerial levels
in the period 2000–2005: 1: increase; 2: no change; 3: decrease
ORG2 Sum of the standardized values of the eight variables COMP_OVERALL,
COMP_WORKPACE, COMP_WORKSEQ, COMP_WORKASSIGN,
CONP_WORKWAY, COMP_PRODUCTION, COMP_CUSTOMER_CONTACT,
and COMP_CUSTOMER
COMP_OVERALL Three-level ordinate variable measuring the change of the distribution of de-
cision competences between managers and employees inside a firm in the
period 2000–2005: 1: shift toward managers; 2: no shift; 3: shift toward
employees
COMP_WORKPACE Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to de-
termine work pace (1: “primarily managers”; 5: “primarily employees”)
COMP_WORKSEQ Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to de-
termine the sequence of the tasks to be performed (1: “primarily managers”;
5: “primarily employees”)
COMP_WORKASSIGN Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to assign
tasks to the employees (1: “primarily managers”; 5: “primarily employees”)
(continued)
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Table 1 Continued
Variables Definition/measurement
COMP_WORKWAY Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to de-
termine the way of performing tasks (1: “primarily managers”; 5: “primarily
employees”)
COMP_PRODUCTION Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to solve
emerging production problems (1: “primarily managers”; 5: “primarily
employees”)
COMP_CUSTOMER-
CONTACT
Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to
contact customers (1: “primarily managers”; 5: “primarily employees”)
COMP_CUSTOMER Ordinate variable measuring the distribution of decision competences to solve
emerging problems with customers (1: “primarily managers”; 5: “primarily
employees”)
HQUAL Share of employees with education at the tertiary level 2004
R&D R&D (yes/no)
EXPORT Exports (yes/no) 2004
LnLCOST/L Natural logarithm of labor costs per employee 2004
D_INCREASE Dummy variable for firms reporting strong increase of demand (values 4 or 5 on
a 5-point Likert scale (1: “very weak”; 5: “very strong”)
D_DECREASE Dummy variable for firms reporting strong decrease of demand (values 1 or 2
on a 5-point Likert scale (1: “very weak”; 5: “very strong”)
IPC Ordinate variable measuring the intensity of price competition at a firm’s main
market on a 5-point Likert scale (1: “very weak”; 5: “very strong”)
INPC Ordinate variable measuring the intensity of nonprice competition (competition
with respect to quality, customer services, etc.) at a firm’s main market on a
5-point Likert scale (1: “very weak”; 5: “very strong”)
LnC/L Natural logarithm of gross investment per employee 2004
LnHQUAL Natural logarithm of share of employees with education at the tertiary level
2004
LnASSET/L Natural logarithm of book value of physical capital per employee 2004
LnR&D/L Natural logarithm of R&D expenditures per employee 2004
Firm size
Medium-sized firms 50–249 employees (dummy variable)
Large firms 250 employees and more (dummy variable)
Control variables
AGE Firm age (foundation year minus 2005)
High-tech industry Dummy variable for chemicals, plastics, machinery, electrical machinery,
vehicles, electronics/instruments
Low-tech industry Dummy variable for all other manufacturing industries
Modern services Dummy variable for banking/insurance, business services
Traditional services Dummy variable for all other service industries
Manufacturing/services Dummy variable for manufacturing/services (reference sector: construction)
Note: When nothing else is specifically mentioned, the variables refer to the period 2003–2005.
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determinants of the propensity to outsource part of firm functions and activities. In
particular, we hypothesize that the likelihood that a firm is engaged in outsourcing
activities is positively correlated with:
 the intensity of use of ICT.
 the intensity of use of human capital.
 the existence of R&D activities of the firm.
 the flexibility of the overall firm organization.
 the degree of decentralization of decision-making competency inside the firm.
 the existence of export activities.
 the average labor costs.
 high volatility of demand on the product market.
 the firm size.
It is not a priori obvious what effects should be expected for the impact of compe-
tition on the propensity of outsourcing. Thus, this issue can be resolved by the
empirical investigation.
2.1.6 Specification of the outsourcing equations
In a first step, we specified based on the abovementioned existing theoretical
and empirical literature an equation for the explanation of outsourcing at firm
level. This contained variables for the use of ICT (variable ICT), the use of
certain forms of workplace organization (e.g. job-rotation, team-work; variable
ORG1), the degree of decentralization of decision-making (variable ORG2), the
existence of R&D activities (variable R&D), the educational level of the employees
(HQUAL), the existence of export activities (EXPORT), the level of labor costs per
employees (lnLCOST/L), the demand perspectives (D_INCREASE; D_DECREASE),
and firm size. Further, controls for sector affiliation, firm age and the competition
conditions [variables for the intensity of price competition (IPC) and nonprice
competition (INPC)] were included in the outsourcing equation (Table 1 for the
definition of the variables). A formal expression of the model in reduced form is as
follows:
Outsourcing equation:
½OUTS FPi;OUTS IPi;OUTS R&Di;OUTS ITiÞ ¼ 0 þ 1ICTi
þ 2ORG1i þ 3ORG2i þ 4HQUALi þ 5R&Di þ 6EXPORTi
þ 7AGEi þ 8ln LCOST=Lð Þiþ9D INCREASEi þ 10D DECREASEi
þ 11IPCi þ 12INPCi þ FSIZEi þ sector dumies þ ui
ð1Þ
We estimated this model for the following four categories of outsourcing: pro-
duction of final products (OUTS_FP); production of intermediate products
(OUTS_IP); R&D (OUTS__R&D); and IT (OUTS_IT).
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2.2 Outsourcing and innovation
2.2.1 Theoretical notions
We conceptualize innovation output as a function of a firm’s endowment with
physical capital and human capital, of demand conditions and of the intensity of
competition in its specific market environment (see Dosi, 1988; Teece et al., 1997):
INNOVi ¼ 0 þ 1C=Li þ 2HCi þ 3DEMANDi þ 4COMPETITIONi ð2Þ
Where C/L is physical capital per employee, HC human capital, DEMAND the de-
mand perspectives and COMPETITION some measure of the intensity of market
competition (for firm i). Outsourcing is inserted in the innovation equation (1) as an
additional factor on the right-hand side of the equation:
INNOVi ¼ 0 þ 1C=Li þ 2HCi þ 3DEMANDi
þ 4COMPETITIONi þ OUTSi
ð2aÞ
(Where OUTSi is a measure of outsourcing of some activity or function).
Not all theoretical predictions about the consequences of outsourcing for innov-
ation performance show in the same direction. Positive effects are expected, first,
through an indirect “profit channel” (Go¨rg and Hanley, 2009): outsourcing would
lead to cost savings and consequently additional profits that could be re-invested in
R&D. Second, innovation performance could be enhanced also directly because out-
sourcing allows the restructuring of the firm toward more skill-intensive, thus more
innovative activities. On the other hand, the arguments for a positive innovation
effect can be opposed by considerations that the development of complex products
calls for stronger vertical integration in order to optimally use specific skills that are
needed for the production of such products (Novak and Eppinger, 2001).
2.2.2 Related empirical literature
The relation between outsourcing and innovation performance is empirically rather
under-researched. Hempell and Zwick (2008), based on data from 860 German firms
in the years 2002 and 2004, found that outsourcing is not associated with the like-
lihood of product innovations. However, outsourcing appears to lead to process
innovation, that is, firms seem to optimize internal organizational structures and
processes after outsourcing. Go¨rg and Hanley (2009) investigated the effects of vari-
ous categories of outsourcing on R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/sales) for about
1600 Irish firms in 2002–2004. They found positive effects for domestic and inter-
national services outsourcing, partly also for domestic and international material
outsourcing, whereas the effects of services outsourcing were larger than those of
material outsourcing.
For this study, we postulate the following hypothesis: Outsourcing activities ex-
ercise a positive effect on firms’ innovation performance.
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2.2.3 Specification of the innovation equation
In a second step, based on the abovementioned theoretical and empirical work, we
formulated an innovation equation that contained as right-hand variables the out-
sourcing variables (Table 1 for the definition of the variables). Further, we distin-
guished between product and process innovation. A formal expression of the model
is as follows:
Product innovation:
INNOPDi ¼ 0 þ 1lnC=Li þ 2ln HQUALð Þiþ3D INCREASEi
þ 4D DECREASEi þ 5IPCi þ 6INPCi þ 7EXPORTi
þ 8 OUTS FPi; OUTS IPi; OUTS R&Di; OUTS ITi½ 
þ controls firm size; sector  þ ui
ð3aÞ
Process innovation:
INNOPCi ¼ 0 þ 1lnC=Li þ 2ln HQUALð Þiþ3D INCREASEi
þ 4D DECREASEi þ 5IPCi þ 6INPCi þ 7EXPORTi
þ 8 OUTS FPi; OUTS IPi; OUTS R&Di; OUTS ITi½ 
þ controls firm size; sector  þ ui
ð3bÞ
[The outsourcing variables are inserted alternatively in the equations (3a) and
(3b) in order to avoid multicollinearity among the outsourcing variables].
2.3 Outsourcing and productivity
2.3.1 Theoretical concepts
The impact of outsourcing on productivity is usually investigated in the production
function framework. The standard approach is based on a Cobb–Douglas production
function of the following form:
Qi ¼ AiCi Li ð4Þ
where Qi is value added, Ai is the technology factor (or some other factor that serves
as shift parameter), Ci is physical capital, and Li is labour, whereas þ ¼ 1 (for
firm i).
By taking natural logarithms and subtracting l (logarithm of L) from both sides of
equation (4) we obtain the following expression for average labor productivity:
q  l ¼ ai þ  ci  lið Þ ð5Þ
where qi, ai, ci, and li are the natural logarithms of Qi, Ai, Ci, and Li, respectively.
Outsourcing has an effect on productivity through the factor Ai of the production
function. This means that outsourcing may exercise an influence on the production
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function by shifting the intercept of the log-linear production function (Olsen, 2006:
9ff.; Amiti and Wei, 2006: 5):
q  l ¼ a0 þ  ci  lið Þ þ OUTSi ð5Þ
(where OUTSi is a measure of outsourcing).
In our specification, we use an augmented production function that takes also
human capital as additional production factor into account.
The theoretically expected effect of outsourcing on productivity is quite straight-
forward. Firms have an incentive to outsource if the costs of producing material
and/or service inputs in-house are higher than outsourcing them. The cost differ-
ences may involve not only production costs in the narrow sense but also transaction
costs. Production costs differences may refer to labor costs, scale economies, and
special skills or expertise (see, e.g. Abraham and Taylor, 1996). When firms decide to
outsource materials or services they relocate the less efficient parts of their produc-
tion process, so average productivity increases. A further source of productivity gains
may come from restructuring that becomes feasible through outsourcing.
Transaction costs may be associated with negotiating and enforcing contracts or
searching for appropriate external suppliers (see, e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
2.3.2 Related empirical literature
The relation between outsourcing and economic performance, mostly average labor
productivity, of the outsourcing firm has been investigated in some recent empirical
studies based on firm data. Using the total cost share of material inputs and the total
cost share of service inputs as outsourcing indicators Go¨rzig and Stephan (2002)
found for a large sample of German firms in the period 1992–2000 a positive impact
of material inputs but no effect of service inputs on the return per employee and a
positive effect of service inputs on return on sales only in the within-estimations.
Ohnemus (2007) investigated the impact of IT outsourcing on labor productivity for
about 1400 German firms in 2004 and found a significant positive effect. In a further
study the same author found also a positive effect for business process outsourcing
on labor productivity for 698 German firms in the period 2000–2007 (Ohnemus,
2009). In both studies outsourcing was measured by a (yes/no)-binary variable.
Go¨tz and Hanley (2004) in a study for 368 Irish electronics firms in the period
1990–1995 found that plants that are substantially larger than the mean employment
size benefit in terms of profitability from outsourcing materials and service inputs,
whereas this does not seem to be the case for small plants. However, the results for
outsourcing of services are not as clear-cut. McCann (2009) investigated the influ-
ence of the share of imported and domestic material inputs, as well as the share of
service inputs on labor productivity separately for exporters, nonexporters and
foreign-owned firms. The study was based on a sample of 1564 Irish firms in
1991–2005. The author found a positive effect of imported material inputs on the
productivity of exporters, also a positive effect of domestic material inputs for
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nonexporters and a negative effect of service inputs on the productivity of
nonexporters. No effect could be found for the entire sample. In a third study also
based on Irish firm data (1099 firms; 1990–1998) Go¨rg et al. (2008) found a positive
effect of the share of imported services on the total factor productivity of exporters
but not of nonexporters. The results of the two last studies demonstrate that experi-
ence in foreign markets is a necessary condition for positive economic effects of
outsourcing to foreign supplies, at least for Irish firms. Finally, Go¨rg and Hanley
(2009) found for a sample of about 1600 Irish firms in 2002–2004 positive effects on
profitability for international and domestic services outsourcing, as well as for do-
mestic material outsourcing but, rather surprisingly, not for international material
outsourcing.
Based on the data for about 4400 UK firms in 1980–1992, Girma and Go¨rg (2004)
found a significant positive effect of material input intensity on labor productivity
for firms in all three sectors (chemicals, electronics, engineering) they investigated. In
a further study for a large sample of 70,044 British establishments in 2000–2003,
Abramovsky and Griffith (2009) found positive effects for expenditure shares of
purchased materials and services on labor productivity, where the effect of material
inputs is larger than that for service inputs.
In a study based on data for about 750 US firms in 1992–2000 Amiti and Wei
(2006) found clearly positive effects of both imported material and service inputs on
both labor productivity and total factor productivity. In the case of labor product-
ivity, the effect of services input is larger than that of material inputs. Finally, in a
study for 213 Spanish firms in 2006/2007, Bustinza-Sanchez et al. (2010) found a
positive effect of outsourcing on a composite measure of economic performance that
was constructed based on factor analysis of several single measures of firm
performance.
In sum, the empirical results appear to be mixed, with a tendency to positive
productivity effects dependent on specific characteristics of the involved firms.
We formulate the following hypothesis: Outsourcing activities exercise a positive
effect on firms’ average labor productivity.
2.3.3 Specification of the productivity equation
In a third step, we investigated the effects of outsourcing on labor productivity
by inserting the outsourcing variables in a productivity equation as specified in
equation (6):
Labor productivity:
ln Q=Lð Þi ¼ 0 þ 1ln C=Lð Þiþ2ln R&D=Lð Þi
þ 3½OUTS FPi; OUTS IPi; OUTS R&Di;OUTS ITi
þ controls firm size; sector  þ ui
ð6Þ
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(The outsourcing variables are inserted alternatively in the equation (6); R&D/L:
R&D expenditures per employee; Table 1 for the definition of the variables).
3. Data
Both Swiss and Greek surveys were conducted in autumn 2005. The reference period
for the qualitative data is the period 2003–2005 unless otherwise mentioned
(Table 2). The reference year for the quantitative variable is 2004. The reference
period for the outsourcing variables is the period 2000–2005. Differences with respect
to the composition of the data by industry in Table A1 appear to reflect the structural
difference between the two countries. For example, the share of textile and clothing
firms, hotels, and catering firms is significantly higher in Greece. On the other hand,
metal working, machinery, electrical machinery, and electronics/instruments are
much stronger represented in Switzerland [Tables with descriptive statistics and
correlation tables of the used variables are not included in the article in order to
keep it shorter, but they can be found in Arvanitis and Loukis (2011)].
3.1 Swiss data
The data used in the Swiss part of this study were collected in the course of a postal
survey among Swiss enterprises using a questionnaire which included questions on
the incidence and within-firm diffusion of several ICT technologies (e-mail, Internet,
intranet, extranet) and new organizational practices (team-work, job rotation, em-
ployees’ involvement), employees’ vocational education and job-related training, and
also on basic economic data for 2004 (sales, value of intermediate inputs, investment
expenditure, number of employees, etc.).4 The survey was based on a disproportion-
ately stratified (with respect to firm size) random sample of firms with at least 20
employees covering all relevant industries of the business sector, as well as firm size
classes (on the whole 29 industries, and within each industry three industry-specific
firm size classes with full coverage of the upper class of large firms).5 Answers were
received from 1803 firms, that is, 38.7% of the firms in the underlying sample. The
response rates do not vary much across industries and size classes with a few excep-
tions (over-representation of paper and energy industry, under-representation of
4The questionnaire was based on a considerable extent on similar questionnaires used in earlier
surveys (see EPOC, 1997; Francois et al. 1999, Vickery and Wurzburg, 1998; Canada Statistics,
1999). Versions of the questionnaire in German, French, and Italian are available in www.kof.
ethz.ch.
5Table A1 contains only 26 industries; the Swiss sample has “watches”, “telecommunication”, and
“computer services” as separate industries that were put together with “electronics/instruments”,
“transport”, and “other business services”, respectively to make the industry classification compar-
able with that of the Greek data.
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hotels, catering, and retail trade). In Table A1 of the appendix in column 2, we can
see the structure of the data set we used for the Swiss part of this study by industry
and firm size class. The nonresponse analysis (based on a follow-up survey of a
sample of the nonrespondents) did not indicate any serious selectivity bias with
respect to the use of ICT and new organizational practices (team-work, job rotation).
A careful examination of the data of these 1803 firms led to the exclusion of 93 cases
with contradictory or nonplausible answers. However, missing values for certain
variables allowed the utilization of only 1575 observations.
3.2 Greek data
The data we used in the Greek part of this study were collected through a postal
survey among Greek enterprises based on the same questionnaire that has been used
in the Swiss part of the study. This questionnaire was translated into Greek and
pretested by three experts highly experienced in such surveys and questionnaires.
Three samples of 300 Greek firms each were randomly selected from the database of
ICAP, a major Greek business intelligence firm (which consists of approximately
135,000 Greek firms from all industries), being all structurally similar to the
sample of the Swiss part of the study with respect to industries and firm size classes.
Firms that definitely refused to participate in this survey were replaced by similar
firms (i.e. from the same industry and size class) from the second sample, whereas in
a few cases, that exhausted the firms of the second sample, we had to proceed to the
third sample. Following the above procedure, which aimed to maintain the propor-
tions of industry and size classes, we finally received responses from 281 firms; after
an examination of the returned completed questionnaires, we excluded 10 cases with
contradictory or nonplausible answers, and the remaining 271 valid responses were
used for the analyses. In Table A1, in column 1 we can see the structure of the final
data set we used for the Greek part of the by industry and firm size class.
A nonresponse analysis was performed (survey of a sample of the nonrespondents),
which did not indicate any serious selectivity bias with respect to the use of ICT, new
Table 2 Various types of outsourcing
Outsourcing of Switzerland Greece
N (%) N (%)
Production of final products 231 (12.8) 34 (12.5)
Production of intermediate products 197 (10.9) 31 (11.4)
Research and development (R&D) 77 (4.3) 16 (5.9)
Information technology 271 (15.0) 61 (22.5)
Note: Percentage of all firms (Switzerland: N¼ 1803; Greece: N¼ 271)
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organizational practices, vocational education, and job-related training. For these
271 firms we also retrieved from the database of ICAP some economic data for
2004 that were not collected through the questionnaire. So we finally obtained for
all these Greek firms all the economic data that were collected for the firms of the
above Swiss data set through the Swiss questionnaire. However, due to missing values
for certain variables only 254 observations could effectively be used in the econo-
metric estimations.
4. Results
4.1 Methodological remarks
4.1.1 Interdependence of the outsourcing variables
Firms in our data often reported more than one category of outsourcing for the same
time period. For this reason, in a first step we took into consideration the inter-
dependence among the outsourcing variables. According to the relevant econometric
literature [e.g. see Greene’s (2011) Econometric Analysis] the recommended ap-
proach for such cases is the multivariate probit estimation, which is a generalization
of the probit estimator that estimates jointly several probit models that have corre-
lated binary dependent variables. Thefore, we proceeded to the estimation of a
multivariate probit model, that is a simultaneous system of four outsourcing equa-
tions for the four different types of outsourcing, instead of four separate probits. We
applied the procedure implemented in STATA that is based on the so-called
GHK-simulator for multivariate distributions.6
4.1.2 Endogeneity issues
Outsourcing equations: there is a potential endogeneity problem with respect to the
determinants of outsourcing propensity due to the fact that both the dependent and
the independent variables are cross-section data with only partial overlapping. We
refrained from a rigorous testing of endogeneity of the numerous right-hand vari-
ables in the outsourcing equations because, it was quite questionable if such testing
would be an adequate procedure given the unusual time structure of this part of the
data. As a consequence, our estimates of the outsourcing equations have to be seen
primarily as an extensive analysis of the correlations between the determinants (that
are considered as structural characteristics that change only slowly over time) and the
outsourcing variables (see Mazzanti et al., 2009: 348; Michie and Sheenan, 2005: 450
6 The STATA procedure ‘mprobit’ estimates M-equation probit models by the method of simulated
maximum likelihood. The Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK)-simulator is applied to evaluate the
M-dimensional normal integrals in the likelihood function (for a description of the GHK-simulator
see Greene 2003).
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for a similar argumentation). Nevertheless, some robust regularities come out, which
if interpreted in view of our hypotheses presented in Section 2.1.5 could possibly
indicate the direction of causal links.
Innovation and productivity equations: we found it not only necessary, but also
feasible to test the possibility of endogeneity of the outsourcing variables when used
as right-hand variables in the two innovation equations and the productivity equa-
tion, respectively. In both cases the outsourcing decisions are to a considerable extent
predetermined (reference period 2000–2005) with respect to the performance vari-
ables (reference period for innovation variables 2003–2005, for productivity variables
2004).
We tested endogeneity by applying the procedure by Rivers and Vuong (1988).
Instrument equations were estimated separately for each outsourcing variable for
both innovation equations and the productivity equations for each country. The
instrument choice was based on three criteria: significant correlation to the instru-
mented variables (the four types of outsourcing), insignificant correlation to the
dependent variables (INNOPD, INNOPC, LnQ/L) and insignificant correlation to
the error term of the innovation equations and the productivity equations, respect-
ively. The residuals (predicted instrumented variables minus original variable) of the
first stage instrument equations were inserted in the innovation equation as add-
itional regressors. Bootstrapping was used in order to correct the standard errors of
the estimated parameters. If the coefficient of the residuals was statistically significant
(at the 10%-test level), we have assumed that endogeneity is a problem and conse-
quently based our inference on instrumented variables; also in this case, standard
errors were estimated by bootstrapping. In cases in which the coefficient of the
residual was not statistically significant, we have assumed exogeneity of the outsour-
cing variables and the estimates were based on the original variables.
On the whole, we tested 12 estimates (four different outsourcing variables for the
two innovation equations and the productivity equation) for each country. In 11 out
of 12 cases for the Swiss data the coefficients of the residuals (predicted instrumented
variables minus original variable) were statistically insignificant at the10% test level.
Therefore, for these cases we could not find any evidence for endogeneity in our
estimates for innovation and productivity. Only in the case of the outsourcing vari-
able OUTS_EP in the INNOPC-equation was the coefficient of the residual statistical
significant. In 9 out of 12 cases for the Greek data no evidence for endogeneity could
be found. In three cases the residual were statistically significant and the instrumen-
tation was necessary (OUTS_IP in both innovation equations and OUTS_EP in the
productivity equations).7
7The tables with the instrument equations and the results of the endogeneity tests were not included
in the article in order to keep it shorter, but they are available in Arvanitis and Loukis (2011).
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4.2 Outsourcing equations
As Table 2 shows, the four types of outsourcing that are investigated in this study are
almost equally represented in both countries—with the exception of ICT outsour-
cing, which has been significantly more likely to take place in Greece than in
Switzerland in the period 2000–2005. In both countries ICT outsourcing has been
the most frequently used type of outsourcing. About 15% of all firms in the Swiss
sample have had relocation of ICT activities in that period of time, with the respect-
ive figure for the Greek sample being 22.5%.
The Tables 3 and 4, respectively show the multivariate probit estimates for the
four outsourcing categories for Switzerland and Greece.8 We identify three central
features in our results. First, the four types of outsourcing are relatively closely
inter-related (see the correlation measures r21 to r43 in the lower part of Tables
3 and 4, respectively). The strongest correlation in both countries is between out-
sourcing of intermediate and final products (r12¼ 0.628 for the Swiss firms;
r12¼ 0.687 for the Greek firms). Further strong correlations are found in
Switzerland between intermediate and final products and R&D. All other links are
significantly weaker. The links between the various types of outsourcing are stronger
in Greece than in Switzerland (with the exception of the link between R&D and final
products). On the whole, the relatively strong positive links between the kinds of
outsourcing point out to complementarities between these types of outsourcing.
Firms seem to apply strategies of restructuring that are oriented at increasing effi-
ciency in more than one bundle of activities at the same time.
Second, we find significant differences with respect to the relevance of the various
factors depending on the kind of outsourcing that is undertaken by a firm. Third, our
model seems to fit better to the Swiss than the Greek data, as we found, based on
separate probit estimates for each outsourcing type not presented here. The low
number of Greek observations could explain only partially this difference.
More concretely, being involved in R&D activities is positively correlated with the
likelihood of outsourcing the production of both intermediate and final products, as
well as R&D in Switzerland and the production of intermediate products, R&D and
IT in Greece. The R&D effect is clearly the strongest common effect. Our results seem
to confirm the theoretical expectations in Bartel et al. (2009). These authors’ main
idea is that as the pace of technological change in production techniques increases, a
firm has less time to amortize the sunk costs related to the adoption of new tech-
nologies. This makes producing in-house with the newest technologies relatively
more expensive than outsourcing. As a consequence, firms try to reduce costs
through the outsourcing of certain parts of production that can be purchased
cheaper from external providers.
8We had to remove the dummy variable for medium-sized firms in the Greek estimates in order to
achieve a convergence of the estimation procedure.
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On the contrary, labor costs do not seem to be the kind of costs that firms want to
reduce through outsourcing. For both countries we could not find any significant
effect for the variable LnLCOST/L.
The intensive use of ICT is a further important factor related positively with the
outsourcing of R&D and ICT in Switzerland but not in Greece. The main reason for
Table 3 Multivariate probit estimates of outsourcing equations for Switzerland
Explanatory variables OUTS_FP OUTS_IP OUTS_R&D OUTS_IT
ICT 0.017 (0.033) 0.026 (0.033) 0.085** (0.043) 0.076*** (0.027)
ORG1 0.047** (0.023) 0.036 (0.024) 0.068** (0.030) 0.084*** (0.021)
ORG2 0.019* (0.010) 0.006 (0.010) 0.021 (0.014) 0.001 (0.009)
HQUAL 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
R&D 0.293*** (0.010) 0.206** (0.104) 0.422*** (0.145) 0.016 (0.092)
EXPORT 0.317*** (0.123) 0.262*** (0.127) 0.187 (0.171) 0.046 (0.098)
AGE 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.009)
LnLCOST/L 0.020 (0.075) 0.027 (0.072) 0.089 (0.095) 0.047 (0.060)
D_INCREASE 0.162 (0.104) 0.066 (0.107) 0.122 (0.141) 0.027 (0.091)
D_DECREASE 0.096 (0.120) 0.184 (0.119) 0.035 (0.168) 0.028 (0.105)
IPC 0.148*** (0.050) 0.063 (0.049) 0.018 (0.065) 0.006 (0.040)
INPC 0.001 (0.047) 0.030 (0.048) 0.029 (0.062) 0.017 (0.040)
Firm size
Medium-sized firms 0.056 (0.074) 0.146* (0.078) 0.031 (0.097) 0.069 (0.062)
Large firms 0.030 (0.087) 0.156* (0.085) 0.083 (0.109) 0.142** (0.072)
Sector
High-tech manufacturing 0.517** (0.208) 0.364* (0.200) 0.068 (0.268) 0.162 (0.170)
Low-tech manufacturing 0.341* (0.196) 0.116 (0.186) 0.150 (0.258) 0.021 (0.153)
Knowledge-intensive
services
0.474* (0.251) 0.721*** (0.249) 0.614* (0.327) 0.043 (0.179)
Traditional services 0.302 (0.218) 0.648*** (0.219) 0.286 (0.273) 0.017 (0.149)
N 1575
Wald 2 306.6***
r21 0.628***
r31 0.449***
r41 0.248***
r32 0.429***
r42 0.224***
r43 0.353***
LR-test of
r21¼ . . .¼
r43¼ 0:
2¼ 244.1***
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively; heteroscedas-
ticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
792 S. Arvanitis and E. N. Loukis
this difference is presumably the lower effectiveness and maturity of Greek firms
in using ICT in comparison with Swiss firms identified in previous studies (see
Arvanitis and Loukis, 2009).
For Switzerland, both organizational variables (ORG1, ORG2) are positively
correlated with the likelihood of outsourcing the production of final products,
whereas ORG1 is also correlated with the likelihood of outsourcing R&D and IT.
Therefore, restructuring through outsourcing is positively linked to changes of
overall organizational structure through the reduction of the number of management
levels and/or changes of workplace organization (team-work, job-rotation) leading
to more operational efficiency. Stronger employee participation through
Table 4 Multivariate probit estimates of outsourcing equations for Greece
Explanatory variables OUTS_FP OUTS_IP OUTS_R&D OUTS_IT
ICT 0.019 (0.078) 0.130 (0.088) 0.132 (0.112) 0.023 (0.064)
ORG1 0.028 (0.063) 0.041 (0.062) 0.009 (0.086) 0.035 (0.048)
ORG2 0.005 (0.025) 0.012 (0.025) 0.054 (0.035) 0.009 (0.021)
HQUAL 0.006 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 0.005 (0.009) 0.003 (0.005)
R&D 0.041 (0.242) 0.442* (0.239) 0.883*** (0.324) 0.409** (0.196)
EXPORT 0.217 (0.240) 0.307 (0.259) 0.250 (0.359) 0.330* (0.201)
AGE 0.008 (0.007) 0.013* (0.007) 0.012 (0.009) 0.005 (0.004)
LnLCOST/L 0.061 (0.115) 0.057 (0.102) 0.111 (0.143) 0.060 (0.079)
D_INCREASE 0.294 (0.265) 0.041 (0.270) 0.010 (0.371) 0.021 (0.228)
D_DECREASE 0.629 (0.409) 0.716 (0.445) 2.340 (4.972)) 0.432 (0.332)
IPC 0.007 (0.113) 0.012 (0.130) 0.170 (0.164) 0.110 (0.097)
INPC 0.162 (0.105) 0.024 (0.112) 0.135 (0.175) 0.139 (0.087)
Firm size
Large firms 0.033 (0.254) 0.048 (0.256) 0.837** (0.333) 0.043 (0.203)
Sector
Manufacturing/services 0.456* (0.239) 0.432* (0.245) 0.977** (0.412) 0.271 (0.200)
N 254
Wald 2 71.8*
r21 0.687***
r31 0.240
r41 0.533***
r32 0.574***
r42 0.537***
r43 0.596***
LR-test of
r21¼ . . .¼ r
r43¼ 0:
2¼ 85.2***
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively;
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
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decentralization of decision-making (ORG2) does not appear to be equally import-
ant for outsourcing. Employee participation is directly contributing to productivity
but is less relevant for efficiency increases through outsourcing. Not astonishingly, no
such effects could be found for Greek firms, presumably for the same reasons as in
the case of ICT.
Swiss exporting firms show a higher outsourcing propensity than nonexporting
firms, a result that is in accordance with earlier empirical studies (see Diaz-Mora and
Triguero, 2007, Bartel et al., 2008, Gusmano et al., 2010, and Debaere et al., 2010).
For both countries we could not find any effect for firm age (with the exception of
a negative sign of this variable in the Greek estimates for the outsourcing of inter-
mediate products), demand conditions, and competition pressure (with the excep-
tion of a positive correlation between outsourcing of final products and price
pressure for Switzerland that could be interpreted as a hint for cost-saving outsour-
cing). The lack of demand effects for the period 2003–2005 could be explained by the
fact that this period has been for both countries a boom period and demand devel-
opment has been quite similar for most firms.
The controversy about the signs of firm size effects cannot be resolved by our
results. There is a tendency for a positive relation between the dummies
medium-sized and large firms (as compared with small firms) and outsourcing of
intermediate products and between the dummy for large firms and the outsourcing
of IT for Swiss firms. The latter effect could be observed, for example, in the bank
and insurance sector, where many larger firms began to restructure the IT depart-
ments that have grown meanwhile, to rather inefficient part-organizations. For
Greece the relation between firm size (large firms as compared with all other
firms) is positive only in the case of R&D outsourcing. Presumably this effect can
be explained by the fact that only larger firms have R&D activities in the Greek
economy, so that only for such firms is R&D outsourcing a strategic option.
In the Swiss economy the outsourcing of parts of production (intermediate and
final products) is primarily a strategy pursued by manufacturing firms, particularly
firms belonging to high-tech industry. Outsourcing of R&D and IT is not a particular
characteristic of the manufacturing sector; it takes place at the same extent in all
sectors (with the exception of knowledge-intensive service industries as for R&D
outsourcing). We find a different picture for the Greek economy. The outsourcing
of production is most common in the construction sector, which is besides tourism,
one of the largest and most dynamic sectors of the Greek economy. Manufacturing
and service firms show a higher propensity than construction firms only with respect
to the outsourcing of R&D.
4.3 Innovation equations
The likelihood of product innovation is positively correlated with three kinds of
outsourcing in the case of Swiss firms: outsourcing of production (of intermediate
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and final products) and R&D (Table 5). For the Greek firms we found a positive
correlation of product innovation with the outsourcing only of production
(intermediate and final products) (Table 6). The effects for process innovation are
positive and statistically significant for all four types of outsourcing for the Swiss
firms (Table 7) and for three kinds of outsourcing (no effect for R&D outsourcing)
for the Greek firms (Table 8).
We cannot distinguish whether the positive effects can be traced back to an in-
direct “profit channel” (Go¨rg and Hanley, 2009) leading to cost savings and conse-
quently additional profits that were re-invested in R&D or whether innovation
performance could be enhanced directly because outsourcing allowed the restructur-
ing of the firm towards more skill-intensive and more innovative activities. On the
whole, our results confirm clearly the theoretical argumentation that expects a posi-
tive impact of outsourcing on innovation. Particularly the results for process innov-
ation can be interpreted as a clear hint for cost-saving outsourcing, especially of less
efficient parts of production, that allow to reinvest additionally available resources
both in new products and in more efficient production techniques.
There are significant differences between the estimates for the Swiss and the Greek
firms with respect to the other variables in the innovation equations. In the case of
the Swiss firms the signs of the variables for capital intensity, human capital, demand
development, and price and nonprice competition pressure are as expected for both
kinds of innovation throughout positive and the respective coefficients statistically
significant. Export is significant only in the product innovation equation. For the
Greek firms only the human capital and the export variable show a positive effect for
product innovation. The insignificance of so many relevant factors reflects to some
extent the rather diffuse profile of innovation activities in the Greek economy.
4.4 Productivity equations
The results in the Tables 9 and 10, respectively show a positive effect of R&D out-
sourcing in the case of Switzerland and a positive effect of the outsourcing of the
production of final products in the case of Greece. The result for R&D outsourcing is
quite in accordance with the findings of earlier studies about the positive effects of
R&D investment in foreign locations (off-shoring of R&D) (see Arvanitis and
Hollenstein, 2007, 2011). The positive effect of outsourcing of final products on
productivity pointing out to a primarily cost-saving outsourcing strategy is in ac-
cordance with the results of recent studies about the effects of off-shoring of pro-
duction to foreign locations such as Romania, Bulgaria, etc. (see Dimelis and Louri,
2002; and Barrios et al., 2004).
Thus, the productivity effects seem to be considerably weaker than the innovation
effects. Outsourcing activities tend to enhance innovation, particularly process in-
novation, but only weakly directly productivity; the productivity effects seem to be
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intermediated (at least for Switzerland) by R&D investment in new products and
processes.
The other variables in the productivity estimates for Switzerland show the ex-
pected positive effects (capital intensity and R&D intensity). In the estimates for the
Greek firms, only the coefficient for the capital intensity variable is positive and
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of the R&D intensity variable is posi-
tive but not significant reflecting the rather low relevance of R&D in the Greek
economy (Arvanitis and Loukis, 2009).
Table 5 Probit estimates of the product innovation equations with outsourcing variables for
Switzerland
Explanatory
variables
INNOPD INNOPD INNOPD INNOPD
LnC/L 0.097*** (0.022) 0.095*** (0.022) 0.094*** (0.022) 0.094*** (0.021)
LnHQUAL 0.110*** (0.037) 0.116*** (0.037) 0.121*** (0.037) 0.123*** (0.036)
D_INCREASE 0.233*** (0.075) 0.240*** (0.075) 0.239*** (0.074) 0.240*** (0.074)
D_DECREASE 0.182*** (0.084) 0.172** (0.084) 0.185** (0.084) 0.186** (0.084)
IPC 0.072** (0.032) 0.080** (0.032) 0.082** (0.032) 0.083** (0.032)
INPC 0.152*** (0.033) 0.146*** (0.033) 0.147*** (0.033) 0.149*** (0.033)
EXPORT 0.137* (0.077) 0.144* (0.077) 0.152** (0.077) 0.161** (0.077)
OUTS_FP 0.497*** (0.108)
OUTS_IP 0.401*** (0.118)
OUTS_R&D 0.375*** (0.183)
OUTS_IT 0.109 (0.091)
Firm size
Medium-sized firms 0.024 (0.038) 0.018 (0.038) 0.029 (0.038) 0.024 (0.038)
Large firms 0.174*** (0.032) 0.164*** (0.032) 0.176*** (0.032) 0.172*** (0.032)
Sector
High-tech
manufacturing
1.147*** (0.136) 1.183*** (0.136) 1.213*** (0.135) 1.221*** (0.135)
Low-tech
manufacturing
0.712*** (0.124) 0.750*** (0.124) 0.761*** (0.135) 0.757*** (0.124)
Knowledge-intensive
services
0.335** (0.138) 0.353*** (0.138) 0.338** (0.137) 0.321*** (0.137)
Traditional services 0.320*** (0.121) 0.342*** (0.121) 0.327*** (0.121) 0.319*** (0.121)
N 1575 1575 1575 1575
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.162 0.159 0.158
Wald 2 353.6*** 354.3*** 348.2*** 349.1***
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively;
heterosceda-sticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
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5. Summary and conclusions
The aim of this article has been to analyze (i) the factors determining the firms’
propensity to outsource various processes, and (ii) the impact of outsourcing on
firms’ innovation performance, as well as labor productivity. The new elements that
this study adds to the existing literature are the following: the integral framework of
analysis of the determining factors of several kinds of outsourcing, as well as their
impact on innovation and productivity using the data sets; and the comparative
setting for two countries, Greece and Switzerland, with fairly different levels of eco-
nomic development. Also, in this article we examine four types of relocation to
external providers, related to the production process of final products and inter-
mediate products, as well as R&D and ICT services, which are measured directly by
having firms reporting whether they have externalized particular processes and func-
tions in the period 2000–2005.
Table 6 Probit estimates of the product innovation equations with outsourcing variables for
Greece
Explanatory variables INNOPD INNOPD INNOPD INNOPD
LnASSET/L 0.009 (0.053) 0.048 (0.058) 0.003 (0.053) 0.002 (0.053)
lnHQUAL 0.195** (0.089) 0.131 (0.102) 0.184** (0.088) 0.184** (0.087)
D_INCREASE 0.005 (0.216) 0.055 (0.260) 0.042 (0.214) 0.040 (0.215)
D_DECREASE 0.188 (0.316) 1.798*** (0.543) 0.256 (0.315) 0.268 (0.316)
IPC 0.093 (0.094) 0.113 (0.101) 0.105 (0.095) 0.101 (0.095)
INPC 0.008 (0.083) 0.022 (0.098) 0.031 (0.083) 0.027 (0.083)
EXPORT 0.481** (0.197) 0.448* (0.245) 0.466** (0.195) 0.473** (0.196)
OUTS_FP 0.490** (0.252)
OUTS_IP 2.526*** (0.510)
OUTS_R&D 0.278 (0.335)
OUTS_IT 0.020 (0.212)
Firm size
Medium-sized
firms
0.395* (0.222) 0.723*** (0.215) 0.391* (0.220) 0.400* (0.221)
Large firms 0.543** (0.237) 0.693*** (0.256) 0.519** (0.239) 0.548** (0.236)
Sector
Manufacturing/
services
0.368* (0.197) 1.518*** (0.342) 0.305 (0.196) 0.325* (0.194)
N 254 254 254 254
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.150 0.069 0.067
Wald 2 22.7** 45.1*** 20.1** 20.1**
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively;
heterosceda-sticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
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In a first step, we specified based on existing theoretical and empirical literature
an equation for the explanation of outsourcing at the firm level. This contained,
besides controls for firm age, sector affiliation and the competition conditions, vari-
ables for the use of ICT, the use of certain forms of workplace organization, the
degree of decentralization of decision-making, the existence of R&D activities, the
educational level of the employees, the existence of export activities, the level of labor
costs per employees, the demand perspectives, and firm size. We estimated this
model for all four categories of outsourcing.
Table 7 Probit estimates of the process innovation equations with outsourcing variables for
Switzerland
Explanatory
variables
INNOPC INNOPC INNOPC INNOPC
LnC/L 0.113*** (0.016) 0.136*** (0.022) 0.134*** (0.021) 0.134*** (0.022)
LnHQUAL 0.058*** (0.026) 0.070** (0.036) 0.073** (0.036) 0.075*** (0.036)
D_INCREASE 0.239*** (0.062) 0.207*** (0.072) 0.204*** (0.073) 0.207*** (0.072)
D_DECREASE 0.272*** (0.068) 0.251*** (0.081) 0.257** (0.081) 0.258*** (0.081)
IPC 0.093*** (0.025) 0.088*** (0.031) 0.089*** (0.031) 0.089** (0.031)
INPC 0.062** (0.027) 0.078** (0.032) 0.079** (0.032) 0.082** (0.032)
EXPORT 0.085 (0.064) 0.082 (0.075) 0.086 (0.076) 0.099 (0.076)
OUTS_FP 0.773*** (0.258)
OUTS_IP 0.240** (0.107)
OUTS_R&D 0.460*** (0.166)
OUTS_IT 0.222** (0.088)
Firm size
Medium-sized firms 0.104*** (0.033) 0.067* (0.037) 0.074** (0.037) 0.069* (0.037)
Large firms 0.176*** (0.032) 0.178*** (0.031) 0.184*** (0.031) 0.178*** (0.031)
Sector
High-tech
manufacturing
0.240 (0.301) 0.600*** (0.130) 0.616*** (0.129) 0.628*** (0.129)
Low-tech
manufacturing
0.050 (0.209) 0.521*** (0.121) 0.529*** (0.120) 0.524*** (0.120)
Knowledge-intensive
services
0.396*** (0.119) 0.386*** (0.135) 0.381** (0.135) 0.355*** (0.135)
Traditional services 0.235*** (0.108) 0.175*** (0.118) 0.169*** (0.117) 0.157*** (0.118)
N 1575 1575 1575 1575
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.098 0.099 0.099
Wald 2 339.0*** 212.9*** 214.8*** 217.7***
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively;
heterosceda-sticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
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The results show remarkable differences between the different forms of outsour-
cing, as well as between the two countries. Intensive use of ICT is important for the
outsourcing of ICT and R&D in Switzerland but not in Greece. Organizational
aspects, especially those related to the formal structure of workplace organization,
are relevant for the Swiss firms but not for the Greek firms. These differences between
the two countries can be explained, at least partly, by the fact that ICT and organ-
ization are considerably less important as factors determining productivity in Greece
than in Switzerland, resulting in lower effectiveness and maturity of Greek firms in
exploiting them in comparison with the Swiss ones. (Arvanitis and Loukis, 2009).
The educational level of employees shows no effect in both countries. A common
trait of both countries is that more innovative firms (R&D) are stronger inclined to
outsourcing activities than less innovative ones. Market conditions (demand, com-
petition) are of minor importance. A further interesting result is that labor costs do
Table 8 Probit estimates of the process innovation equations with outsourcing variables for
Greece
Explanatory
variables
INNOPC INNOPC INNOPC INNOPC
LnASSET/L 0.084 (0.061) 0.067 (0.067) 0.092 (0.060) 0.092 (0.060)
LnHQUAL 0.036 (0.087) 0.025 (0.090) 0.027 (0.086) 0.021 (0.087)
D_INCREASE 0.062 (0.225) 0.032 (0.263) 0.113 (0.223) 0.086 (0.222)
D_DECREASE 0.318 (0.328) 1.099* (0.570) 0.393 (0.325) 0.351 (0.324)
IPC 0.082 (0.095) 0.101 (0.101) 0.094 (0.096) 0.085 (0.095)
INPC 0.007 (0.082) 0.016 (0.093) 0.021 (0.083) 0.037 (0.083)
EXPORT 0.310 (0.198) 0.268 (0.223) 0.291 (0.197) 0.267 (0.196)
OUTS_FP 0.583** (0.256)
OUTS_IP 1.826*** (0.601)
OUTS_R&D 0.219 (0.343)
OUTS_IT 0.403* (0.213)
Firm size
Mediumsized
firms
0.657*** (0.231) 0.906*** (0.263) 0.656*** (0.229) 0.646*** (0.228)
Large firms 0.869*** (0.246) 0.979*** (0.252) 0.849*** (0.247) 0.850*** (0.244)
Sector
Manufacturing/
services
0.082 (0.199) 0.701** (0.308) 0.147 (0.196) 0.151 (0.194)
N 254 254 254 254
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.138 0.093 0.104
Wald 2 29.5*** 39.6*** 25.2*** 30.9***
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively;
heterosceda-sticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
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not appear to be a significant factor determining the likelihood of outsourcing. This
means that labor costs saving is not a crucial incentive for outsourcing as part of
economic literature supposes. Finally, we could not find a clear-cut firm size effect.
In a second step, we formulated an innovation equation that contained the out-
sourcing variables as right-hand variables. We found positive effects of outsourcing
of the production of final and intermediate products on the propensity to product
innovations for both countries, also of R&D outsourcing for Switzerland. Further, we
found positive effects for all four outsourcing activities for Switzerland and for three
of them (exception: R&D outsourcing) for Greece in the case of process innovation.
In a third step, we investigated the effects of outsourcing on labor productivity by
inserting the outsourcing variables in a productivity equation. The results show a
positive effect of R&D outsourcing in the case of Switzerland and a positive effect of
the outsourcing of the final products’ production in the case of Greece. Thus, the
productivity effects of outsourcing seem to be considerably weaker than the innov-
ation effects. Outsourcing activities tend to enhance innovation, particularly process
Table 10 OLS estimates of the productivity equations with outsourcing variables for Greece
Explanatory
variables
LnQ/L LnQ/L LnQ/L LnQ/L
LnASSET/L 0.115** (0.042) 0.120*** (0.040) 0.120*** (0.040) 0.119*** (0.040)
LnR&D/L 0.024 (0.020) 0.026 (0.021) 0.029 (0.021) 0.028 (0.022)
OUTS_FP 0.507* (0.306)
OUTS_IP 0.152 (0.181)
OUTS_R&D 0.394 (0.319)
OUTS_IT 0.201 (0.203)
Firm size
Medium-sized
firms
0.255 (0.177) 0.248 (0.161) 0.264 (0.162) 0.261 (0.156)
Large firms 0.045 (0.176) 0.107 (0.168) 0.153 (0.161) 0.126 (0.167)
Sector
Manufacturing/
services
0.341 (0.216) 0.150 (0.131) 0.189 (0.148) 0.167 (0.149)
N 254 254 254 254
R2 0.065 0.054 0.060 0.058
Wald 2 14.9**
F 2.7** 3.1*** 3.1***
Root MSE 1.037 1.045 1.043 1.043
Note: Statistical significance at ***1%, **5%, and *10% test levels, respectively;
heterosceda-sticity-robust standard errors (White-procedure).
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innovation, but only weakly directly productivity. For the Swiss firms, for which also
a positive effect of R&D expenditure per employee on productivity was found, the
productivity effects of outsourcing might be intermediated by new product and
processes generated by R&D investment.
Unfortunately, we could not distinguish in this study between outsourcing to
domestic and foreign providers. Let us suppose that our results hold also for foreign
outsourcing. In this case there are some interesting policy implications to be men-
tioned here. The first one is that high labor costs should not be necessarily the main
driver of outsourcing. This is especially relevant for the high-wage country
Switzerland. Second, even if efficiency gains due to outsourcing do not lead primarily
to productivity increase, they seem to show themselves as drivers of the innovation
performance of outsourcing firms.
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Appendix
Table A1 Composition of the data sets by industries and firm size classes
Greece Switzerland
N (%) N (%)
Industry
Food, beverage 25 (9.2) 77 (4.5)
Textiles (2.2) 24 (1.4)
Clothing, leather 7 (2.6) 6 (0.3)
Wood processing 3 (1.1) 27 (1.6)
Paper 3 (1.1) 24 (1.4)
Printing 12 (4.4) 52 (3.0)
Chemicals 12 (4.4) 66 (3.8)
Plastics, rubber 6 (2.2) 38 (2.2)
Glass, stone, clay 9 (3.3) 28 (1.7)
Metal 4 (1.5) 24 (1.4)
Metal working 7 (2.6) 106 (6.2)
Machinery 1 (0.4) 165 (9.7)
Electrical machinery 2 (0.7) 50 (2.9)
Electronics, instruments 3 (1.1) 122 (7.1)
Vehicles 2 (0.7) 20 (1.1)
Other manufacturing 5 (1.8) 30 (1.8)
Energy 3 (1.1) 33 (1.9)
Construction 14 (5.2) 179 (10.5)
Wholesale trade 52 (19.2) 142 (8.3)
Retail trade 21 (7.7) 102 (6.0)
Hotels, catering 27 (10.0) 56 (3.3)
Transport, Telecommunication 15 (5.2) 91 (5.3)
Banks, insurances 5 (1.8) 73 (4.3)
Real estate, leasing 2 (0.7) 11 (0.6)
Business services 16 (5.9) 151 (8.8)
Personal services 10 (3.7) 11 (0.6)
Firm size
20–49 employees 88 (32.5) 474 (27.7)
50–249 employees 105 (38.7) 875 (51.2)
250 employees and more 78 (28.8) 361 (21.1)
Total 281 (100.0) 1710 (100.0)
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